

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 15, 2006

**TO:** K. Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** R. Quirk and W. Linzau, Hanford Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Activity Report for the Week Ending September 15, 2006

Outside Expert D. Boyd was on-site this week.

K Basins Closure (KBC): The site reps and outside expert observed the second and final week of the contractor's Operational Readiness Review (ORR) and the Richland Operations Office (RL) line management review for the Hose-in-Hose Transfer System. The reviews were adequate. The ORR team concluded that the system would be ready for a DOE ORR after completing the necessary pre-start findings. The final team report should be issued next week. At the outbrief the contractor's team identified nine preliminary pre-start and seven post-start findings and 15 negative observations. The RL team concluded that the contractor's review was adequate, but identified that four additional items would have to be completed before the DOE ORR. Two of the RL team recommendations were to improve the reliability of the communications system and to demonstrate an ability to conduct operations around the clock.

A violation of a Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) Administrative Control was identified when it was noted that the IP2 container lid was moved over the North and South Loadout Pits without meeting critical lift requirements. The TSR specifies use of the critical lift procedure, which has special precautions for lifting heavy items, such as documenting the load path and rigging requirements. The lifts were associated with removing and reinstalling the lids for the IP2 waste containers, which weigh approximately 1,200 pounds. Deficiencies have been previously noted in this work package (see Hanford Activity Report 9/8/06).

The site rep observed a technical workshop in which Fluor Hanford presented to DOE the technical basis for the basin turnover acceleration proposal (see Hanford Activity Report 8/25/06). The project believes that no safety-class components will be required for retrieval, shipment, interim storage, and treatment. Interim storage in the cells at T Plant would start in October 2007 and treatment would not start until November 2011. Although a four-year delay between interim storage and treatment is proposed, it was apparent during the meeting that impetus for treatment would be removed after the sludge is transported to T Plant. It is conceivable that interim storage could be extended based on future funding.

Waste Treatment Plant (WTP): The drilling operations on deep borehole C4996 and corehole C4998 have been completed. The borehole final depth below grade was 1,468 feet and the corehole drilling was stopped at 1,400 feet. Last week 720 feet of pipe fell into this borehole but was successfully removed. Inspection for damage has commenced.

Tank Farms: The site rep performed a walk-down of the C-204 waste storage tank to evaluate worker safety during manual operation of a failed retrieval mast.